Abstract
This proposal is the foremost consensus model for both representing and protecting the small investors in the voting pool. The following issues to be balanced into this model have been chosen:
Privacy
Simplicity for the end user
Balance, protection, and respect for all groups of the community
Maximization of network value. It is understood that network value may have modelled by $V=N2SI$(described in detail below)
Maximization of the total utility the PIVX network provides for its end users, who are the real source of its value.
Proper representiation for the general usership is of particular concern, because the relationship between a social networks value and the quantity*quality of its members is approximately quadratic ($N2$).
Resistance to vote gaming, agressive system tuning, and unhealthy feedback
The model presented here is designed to respect the fundamental value model of a cryptocurrency. N2SI (described in detail later) It is also designed to respect the various conundrums of voting that result from currently used voting models that are starved of information. The last challenge to be managed is to curtail the arrival of common feedback loop misbehaviors that are evident in current politics as well as common feedback systems.
This document describes how a voting architecture may be capable of solving sundry known voting quandries, notably those arising from an inadequate collection of information to make proper decisions, as well as the growth of the unhealthy feedback behaviour which is already recognizable from contemporary political systems, and their tendency to extreme wealth inequality. A major tool for handling these issues is an advanced balloting system, which allows voters to both rank their preferences, and provide negative feedback.
Consensus information for PIVX denies explicit identity. It must come from the blockchain itself and be private key verifiable. Under this architecture, it is very difficult, without sacrificing privacy, to prevent the wealthy, from gaining proportionally greater representation, since they can always feign the appearance of many small investors if they so desire. Therefore, in order to protect small investors from virtually being robbed by the wealthy, who can make stronger votes, it remains to provide an incentive for large investors to consolidate their holdings which is greater than their incentives to feign small investors.
One principal device for this is the provision of leadership opportunities for large stake holders and developers, with simultaneous ensurement of protection for small investors, hence the name "PIVmetheus". Said opportunities arise from three layered voting. The layers will be named after the elements of the value expression N2, S, and I. Network support nodes will have an upper hand in the second, 'S' layer, large stake holders ( perhaps developers at some point in time) in a separate 'I' layer, and the rest in the 'N2' layer.
An important part of this strategy is to keep multiple investor groups competing. If three maligning gold hunters are coming back from the Sierra Madre, with packs full of treasure, there is far greater security than with two, because if any member of the party were to attempt a heist, he'd be outnumbered, two to one. How to keep democracy between eleven sheep and thirteen wolves with a sheeps wardrobe? One way is to keep them in two huts, with hay fed to the first, and beef to the second. The huts vote seperately, may veto decisions, and if a wolf leaves to the sheep bin, the rest get to split his beef.